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Abstract 
The paper wishes to define and defend a moderate version of realism which we call modal 
realism. The difference between ontology and epistemology is first pointed out and we focus 
on the ontological side. We think it is often neglected because ontological issues are often 
assimilated to epistemological ones. We try to fill this gap in literature by defining an 
ontological level of reasoning. We then offer a test for the opposing camps in ontology: that 
of constructionism and that of realism by taking an example that can be interpreted both ways: 
the controversial merger of Snecma and Sagem into Safran, a French conglomerate. A merger 
raises ontological questions, merging being in itself an ontological process of two becoming 
one. Dwelling on the importance of this ontological issue, we then offer a presentation of 
modal realism. We once again depart from the merger case to show how this realism allows 
for a flexible and dynamics vision of reality, accounting for the “vague” and multilayered 
dimensions of social objects. It proposes a scale of beings, relations and combinations via 
“layered dimensions” in a modal ensemble. Throughout the example of the different levels of 
commitment, we hope to present a thorough description of modal realism as a matter-of-fact 
approach aimed at capturing the subtle dimensions of social objects such as organisations.  
 
Keywords: realism, constructionism, ontology, modal realism, merger 
 
 
 2 
 
The Wedding the Carp and the Rabbit:  
A Realist Stand for an Ontology of Social Facts and Organizational Objects 
 
“You don’t know much and that’s a fact.”  
The Duchess, Alice in Wonderland. 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper wishes to define and defend a moderate version of realism which we call modal 
realism. The difference between ontology and epistemology is first pointed out and we focus 
on the ontological side. We think it is often neglected because ontological issues are often 
assimilated to epistemological ones. We try to fill this gap in literature by defining an 
ontological level of reasoning. We then offer a test for the opposing camps in ontology: that 
of constructionism and that of realism by taking an example that can be interpreted both ways: 
the controversial merger of Snecma and Sagem into Safran, a French conglomerate. A merger 
raises ontological questions, merging being in itself an ontological process of two becoming 
one. Dwelling on the importance of this ontological issue, we then offer a presentation of 
modal realism. We once again depart from the merger case to show how this realism allows 
for a flexible and dynamics vision of reality, accounting for the “vague” and multilayered 
dimensions of social objects. It proposes a scale of beings, relations and combinations via 
“layered dimensions” in a modal ensemble. Throughout the example of the different levels of 
commitment, we hope to present a thorough description of modal realism as a matter-of-fact 
approach aimed at capturing the subtle dimensions of social objects such as organisations.  
 
 3 
Introduction 
 
Organization science has for a long time been presented as having a practical orientation. In 
this regard, organization science is legitimate because it happens to be useful in real life, no 
matter the rigour of the concepts. Since the science is action oriented, there is no real need for 
a thorough theoretical ground. In a more advanced vision of organisation science, it emerges 
from a combination of other disciplines, older, with a thorough theoretical background. In this 
option, epistemological questions are raised in relation to these disciplines: most of the tools 
are borrowed from them, in a pragmatic orientation. Their concepts can always be used as a 
theoretical backbone, should a scientific justification be required. However, when taking this 
epistemologic/pragmatic stand, one may forget that these other disciplines such as sociology, 
psychology or even economy have themselves borrowed some of their foundations to other 
fields of knowledge, among which ontology. Ontology has been called “the science of being” 
since Aristotle, we understand it as a scientific description of ontological structures of the 
world such as properties, objects as congeries of properties, eventually facts. Another 
approach would be to recognize that organization science offers specific issues for ontology 
and epistemology. This is our approach and we believe it may raise new issues and fill a gap 
in literature. 
Indeed, we believe that some of the issues that are now increasingly vivid (because 
organization needs a scientific legitimacy and concepts to assess its independence) are often 
mistaken for epistemological questions, whereas it is a matter of ontology. Namely, when one 
asks: “does □ exist?”, what is at stake is not the truth value of “□” but the existence of “□”. To 
let epistemology take the helm is to examine first the means to have access to objects, even 
before specifying their modes of existence. We believe this is what may happen to the debate 
around critical realism (Mir & Watson, 2001; Kwan & Tsang, 2001) if nothing is done to put 
ontology back in its place. 
If not, ontology is reduced to a series of presuppositions which can hardly be combined. 
Therefore, it seems more judicious to start with the criteria of admission of entities. This stand 
is what we call: “realism”. One could even say that organisation science is one of the last one 
to realize it deals with existants (properties, general and particular, objects…) although, by 
tradition, theoreticians are often out in the field, in direct contact with reality, where they fully 
weight the “being” of facts, matters and practices. We argue, in this paper, that because we, as 
practitioners, deal with specific issues, we target a systematic knowledge in order to optimize 
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the rationality of the decisions. The idiosyncrasy of each field and situation does not mean 
that there is no way to relate it to a more general vision: this does not mean one forgets about 
the relative position and the singular discourse of an actor. It means that in addition to this 
level of analysis, another scale can be needed to evaluate the nature of the questions raised. 
Both levels are combined to be comprehensive about “what is at stake”. Finally, the 
compelling nature of action does not imply that metaphysics have no say on such things. 
As a consequence of this realist position of ours, the one initial assumption in this paper is 
that ontology differs from epistemology. We are aware that in most research papers in 
organization science, scholars take an opposite stand. To give a brief overview of this 
tradition, they follow Berger & Luckman (1996 (1966)) who claim that “society is a social 
construction” with both objective and subjective sides. Because they focus on the “sociology 
of knowledge” (Berger & Luckman, 1996: 256), they assume that reality is a “social 
construction”.  
Ontology is reachable only via epistemology which builds its objects such as organizations 
and mergers. Gergen (2001), von Glasersfeld (2001; 2005) have about the same position to 
look at social sciences issues. Lincoln (1985: 139) sees these issues as requiring epistemic 
constructs because they are “emerging”. Hacking (2001) has adopted a more nuanced stand 
on social constructionism, even in social issues where it seems to have found its turf. Le 
Moigne (2007) compares constructionist epistemologies, and from his comparison, one may 
adopt a more nuanced position about constructionism: some constructionists would admit that 
there are ontological questions independently of epistemology and prior to it, whereas others 
would deny all ontology, since epistemology presides to the construction of all “social facts” 
and there is no going beyond these representations.  
Using his linguistic and philosophical background, Searle (1998 a; 1998b) has successfully 
argued against the Berger & Luckman theory by admitting an ontological foundation to most 
epistemological issues. His main argument, which we shall try to illustrate in this paper, is 
that one cannot look at the truth value of anything without first having in mind its nature of 
existence: is it a fact, a perception, an impression, an imagination, a hypothesis? To us, a fact 
exists by itself and can be comprehensively known. As we shall see, however, facts are 
combined in multiple layers, and some of them are vague, an ontological complexity which 
constructionists (as opposed to positivists) often account for effectively even though they 
would not confer them existence beyond representations. We do confer different degrees of 
existence, some of which are beyond representation (Livet & Nef, 2008).  
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Throughout this text, we accordingly attempt to demonstrate that an ontology of social facts is 
useful in organization science just as in any other science. More specifically, we believe that a 
realist point of view is an approach which takes into account the being of social facts per se, 
whereas constructionism attempts to reduce the realm of social facts to mere construction, 
thereby denying the necessity of an ontology of social objects as existants
i
. We consider that 
this type of constructionism is a problem in management science and in organisation theory, 
especially given the present battle between neo-realist positivism and social constructionism
ii
.  
We believe that this social constructionism trend may have been caused by the domination of 
positivism and naïve realism in management science. It has been the tool for much needed 
critics when too many positivist papers were only concerned with the internal coherence and 
pertinence of their models and never put to question the concepts they were dealing with. 
However, this positivist domination may never be really shaken by theories which only offer a 
criticism of their facts and interpretations and not build other pictures of reality which offer a 
rich vision of organizational realia without shadowing their material. As a result, positivism 
and constructionism reinforce each other and they turn a deaf ear to intermediate positions to 
which real life facts have given rise to.  
We argue that an ontology of social facts may offer an elegant way to reconcile “the field” 
and varied interpretations of the multiple “fields” that can be an object for research. This is 
also an answer to those who argue it is possible to deal with these problems by opting out of 
“ideological feuds”. 
To prove our case, we first offer a test for the opposing camps of constructionism and realism 
by taking an example that can be interpreted both ways: the contested merger of Snecma and 
Sagem into Safran, a French conglomerate. We then offer a presentation of modal realism and 
we still use the merger case to show how this realism allows for a flexible and dynamics 
vision of reality, accounting for the “vague” and “multilayered” dimensions of social objects. 
Vagueness and layers are the basis of what would be a new type of epistemology for 
organization science and for management in general. 
By showing the shortcomings and the pitfalls of a constructionist vision of the Safran case-
study, we attempt to speak for the realist stand which we define in a more faithful version 
than that usually put to trial in the post-modern tradition. Through this paper, not only do we 
take a stand in favour of realism, we also attempt to draw the limits between each camp, that 
of realism and that of constructionism, since these two theories often assume confusing 
shapes when transferred from metaphysics to organization science (Fleetwood & Ackroyd, 
2004) via other disciplines also dealing with social objects.  
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The Snecma-Sagem merger into Safran from a Constructionist point of 
view 
 
In this first part, we focus on the case of the merger of two French-based conglomerates, 
Snecma and Sagem into Safran.  
Generally speaking, the study of mergers is a good topic for ontology because merging is in 
itself an ontological process of two becoming one. We suggest that the Safran case-study, 
recently produced by the merger of Sagem and Snecma (two French groups present in the 
aeronautics, electronics and defence industries) can be a good illustration of the necessity to 
take have a clear vision of such social objects as organisations, industry sectors, competitive 
groups, key resources and identity.  
The reason for the choice of this particular merger is that one of the authors has been an inner 
observer of part of the course of events and has later co-authored a case-study about it 
(Castañer & al., 2007). Therefore, the analysis of the merger, although succinct, is based on 
various sources of information: direct observation, interviews, archives and a large press 
review.  
Throughout the initial presentation of the merger, we assume a moderate constructionist 
stand, insisting on the discursive nature of most of the information. We adopt this view on 
things because criticism generally goes the other way round (Mir & Watson, 2000), and it is 
seldom the case that a moderate approach of realism is finally assumed. We then go into the 
definition of a moderate version of realism and we try to explain how it can offer clear and at 
the same time flexible notions to use, immune from the usual accusations against realism and 
its positivist generalizations. 
Since the goal of this presentation is to illustrate the debate constructionism versus realism, 
only a broad overview of the facts and keys issues is first presented to understand the main 
issues which are then presented as illustrations to constructionist arguments. This 
constructionist is finally put to question.  
 
The Merger of Snecma and Sagem into Safran 
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The Merger between Snecma and Sagem was announced on October the 29
th
 2006 and the 
deal was met with considerable surprise both within the two organizations and outside, by 
market analysts and experts of the two sectors, plane engines fro Snecma and electronic 
devices for Sagem. Cost-synergies were the main alleged cause for the merger. Some 700 
millions euros cost-synergies were alluded to for no sooner than year 2008. The State floated 
some of its shares of these firms in its privatizing process and it gained 800 million euros 
whereas the stock-market prices were plummeting. Sagem lost 12 %. 
In the following months, Sagem absorbed Snecma, which was twice its size in market 
capitalization. This urged some people to say that the merger aimed at getting at Sagem’s nest 
egg at its detriment. Others replied that, in a time of patriotic efforts in favour of French 
capitalism, it was an effort to reach critical size not so different from the external growth 
tradition of both groups.  
The two firms were the produce of nearly a century of mergers and acquisitions, and they 
were flagships of the French industrial heritage. They were both engineers firms, and they 
were both involved in the Defence industry, one of the reasons why the State has had so much 
influence on their fate. Snecma story goes back to 1904 when Gnome and Rhône were 
created. Its story is central in the epic of French aircrafts and airlines throughout both in war 
and peace. In the year 1974, it became international when a partnership was concluded with 
General Electric (GE) to build the CFM 56, an engine for middle-size civil airplanes which 
soon became a classic for aircraft manufacturers in the world.  
The firm had a tradition in aeronautics, and it progressively acquired some rivals and partners, 
mostly in France. So far, the recent acquisitions, managed by Jean-Paul Béchat, the CEO, had 
been successful because the targets were part of the same business and because they were 
quite small in comparison to the holding. There was also a long tradition of coopetition in an 
industry where cycles lasted 15 to 25 years (life of an engine), most of the targets had had 
lasting ties with Snecma, and traditionally, engine manufacturers use their prestige to rule 
over component manufacturers.  
At the time of the merger, the industry was growing a 2 to 3% a year due to diversification but 
a lot of investments were presently required to adapt to electronic changes in the command 
controls of planes as well as operating systems. Snecma had also entered new markets such as 
Russia, China and India, where important costs were involved, due to the delocalization of 
parts of the production. These moves had been urged by the rapid consolidation of the 
industry as well as that of partners in the value chain
iii
. The end of a cycle of growth was 
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predictable in the coming years, so Snecma was in a position to study alliances, partnerships 
and possibly mergers. 
Sagem was created in 1924 by a young engineer, Marcel Môme. It specialized in cables and 
telephone, then SAT worked with Airbus and the plane industry. In 1984, the firm was bought 
by its employees in one of the largest employee buyouts (in French RES, rachat d’une 
enterprise par ses salariés) in French history. This influenced a lot the culture of the firm, 
based on participation and empowerment. Yet, Sagem has had to adapt to worldwide 
competition and the domination of Nokia, Motorola and Samsung. Mass market electronics 
was the playground for ferocious cost competition, and Sagem was only ranking 15 in terms 
of market size. Although its operating profits were only 5-7% a year, some said that Sagem 
had been merged with Snecma because it had a stash of cash and grim prospects in the mobile 
phone industry. This would be a unique occasion to begin restructuring and delocalization 
would be a good way to get rid of some of the less profitable divisions such as mobile phone 
manufacturers. This move had been anticipated by agreements with a Chinese partner, Ningo 
Bird. 
As a result of the merger, the firm was present in 30 countries and employed some 56 200 
people. Its turnover was 10,4 million euros in 2004 and its REX 7,7. Of the CA, 42 % came 
from propulsion, 22 from communication, 24 from airplane equipment and 21 from defence 
and security. 61 % came from Europe, 20% from North America, 9 % from Asia and 10% 
from the rest of the world. The group was now said to weight the critical size to be protected 
against “foreign hostile takeovers”, since at that time, a lot of energy was devoted to the 
defence of French national champions in the name of “Economic Patriotism”. A 
communication expert group, l’Agence Nomen, had been hired to work on a new common 
identity for the group and it had picked a new name, Safran, out of some 4250 suggestions 
from employees. This communication strategy was lambasted in the press after it had been the 
focus of attention to the detriment of actual descriptions of the impact of the merger within 
the firms. It did not appeal to employees, who claimed their identity remained that of their 
original firms or even the specific sites where they worked. It did little to attract investors, 
judging by the stock price of Safran in the market. To sum up, this merger, with all its 
mishaps, seems fit to illustrate a constructionist approach of organizations. 
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The Birth of Safran, from a Constructionist Point of View: 
 
There are many implicit references to constructionism in the initial presentation of the merger 
we gave. However, most of the arguments should be made explicit and related to specific 
theoretical stands. To do this, we imported a rather thorough model which we found in the 
literature on ontology. Fin Collins (1997) gave seven constructionist arguments in his book 
Social Reality: We first list key issues concerning the merger to then examine how they fit 
with Collins’s constructionists arguments. We adopt this method because realists are often 
accused of neglecting empirical facts in favour of theory so they would fit better in the model. 
 
- One issue is the importance of the official announcement of the merger: Hitt, Freeman 
and Harrison (2001: 384) says the definition of a merger is when companies combine 
to form a legal entity. Once you decide to merge two groups into one, it becomes one 
group. Experts in communication have been hired to build a brand image for it but the 
main point is that it exists as a moral person on paper. Then the new “group” is no 
less craftily built than the two previous ones, even though it may be less legitimate 
because it is new. All organisations are made of “narrative matter” and fictions 
(Barry & Elmes, 1997) at least initially (Kahane, 2000). 
In Collins, the first of the large argument is that the nature of the rules of action (from 
Wittgenstein, thought shapes reality, gives it meaning, informs it). The problem is that, in 
this approach, it begins difficult to define the identity of an organization in addition to the 
“bundle of contracts” (Coase, 1927) and the brand. 
- Another issue is that of the difference in points of view: financial analysts disagree 
with economists. Here is a short series of quotes from the press: Thierry Breton, the 
then Minister of Economy was quoted saying that “there (was) no industrial logic to 
the deal”, popularizing the expression: “the wedding of the carp and the rabbit”. Yet, 
other articles had pointed out, from an engineering point of view, the need for 
synergies as the plane industry was changing through technological innovation: 
“electronics pervades all crafts and trades” (July 2004). To this argument, a London 
broker opposed that of the plurality of options for the merger: « a merger with Thales 
would have made much more sense in our view ».  
Collins’s second argument is that of cultural relativity (standards vary from culture to 
culture, they are idiosyncratic). One may not only point out the differences between 
professions but the differences between the national press and the international press 
 10 
coverage (Vaara & alii, 2006)°. However, these last authors point out the lack of objective 
information on mergers rather than the impossibility to reach a unified view of the event. 
They argue that such a common ground would be much needed for people to understand 
important strategic decisions and be able to react. 
- A third issue is that of managerial leeway. In the press, some critics echoes what is 
known in management literature as “the principal/agent” divergence of interests. 
Managers, especially Jean-Paul Béchat, the CEO of Safran, were accused of hubris. 
Some said that he feared to lose control of the group in favour of one of its 
shareholders and partner, General Electrics. Amihud and Lev (1981; 1999) and Lane, 
Cannella and Lubatkin (1998 ; 1999) have had heated debates on this question. The 
conclusion of this debate seems to be that, even though compatibilities do exist 
between scientific approaches, some assumptions remain incompatible, such as the 
definition of value creation in strategy and finance. 
Collins’s third large argument is that of rational relativity (standards of truth and reality 
vary). However, if different assumptions on the same facts may lead to different 
conclusions about the legitimacy of a decision, we may as well consider that this is all a 
matter of power of negotiation between groups and experts.  
- Yet another issue is that, in the heat of the debate, no one seems to share the same 
definition of what is at stake in the merger: If all actors have different ways of 
referring to things, therefore the best way to have them agree on the merger is to issue 
communication statements even though every one disagrees with their content. Dissent 
may be voiced but it is part of one large sum of assumptions and opinions. Agreement 
and “sensemaking” (Weick, 1995) emerge from coalitions and compromise. As a 
symbol of this “identity building process” the name of the group, Safran, has been 
chosen in a democratic way after an employee consultation (although it is difficult to 
understand what were the actual proceedings). Some authors believe that the failure 
of many mergers might be avoided if they were planned in a more integrative way 
(Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999) and if they were planned in the long-run in terms of 
strategic resources (Capron, 1999). Comprehensive matrices could take into account 
strategy, organisation and human resources and combine short and long term interest 
of the firm.  
Collins’s fourth and last large argument against realism is that of linguistic relativity 
(languages cuts an otherwise continuous substratum into entities that can be defined in a 
conceptual way). The argument for Safran is as follows; either these entities can succeed 
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in reflecting reality, and matrices are efficient to plan a successful merger, or the entities 
remain conceptual entities and they fall short of their official duty, which explains the 
difficulty in successfully implementing mergers. However, the parade to 
misunderstandings in mergers does not seem to depend only on the quality of translation 
and of planning and communication tool.  
 
Large arguments defend a specific vision which implies that social facts are built as objects of 
collective processes. They can also be consensual agreements allowing classification, 
explanation or conceptualisation, despite the artifice of the device. The four arguments, that of 
the nature of the rules of action, of cultural, rational and linguistic relativity, interestingly, are 
often combined in constructionists discourses although their assumptions as well as their 
conclusions hardly match. Indeed, let’s imagine the following argument by a constructionist : 
the merger is a construct because it was made to exist by managerial decree even though there 
is no common identity to it, due to the relativity of actors’ ties, thoughts and language. One 
may reply: either the construct has been made, and it is a reality because it was born, or it has 
no existence, and it will never have one because it should have existed before it was born 
artificially, either the construct is made of cultural contents, or it is only a cognitive and 
linguistic issues since organisation culture is a mere artefact. Reductionist questions take their 
toll as to the ability of constructionism to determine the nature of the “construction”. As we 
shall see, this “large based” argumentation is not easily compatible with the narrow based 
constructionism, since large arguments adopt an external, objective point of view, whereas 
narrow arguments stem from a subjective, contextual point of view. 
Whereas the large approach arguments focus on the logic of interpretation, the narrow 
arguments stem from the very nature of action, the object of research as opposed to the 
structure of research. In the case of the narrow arguments strictly speaking, they can be 
combined or used separately. Their combinatory nature comes from their cognitively based 
approach. Their point of view is that of the subject and his or her oriented position whether 
they are the observed or the observer. These arguments also echo important questions raised 
by the merger. 
- The question of managerial responsibility is raised: managers who fight and hide 
information are only acting according to their feelings. They react to a specific 
situation and they may be protecting the firm from external threats. Practitioners in 
management have often criticized scholars for neglecting situational idiosyncratic 
data which their absence on the scene made them unable to collect. 
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This phenomenological argument (action is laden with subjective meaning) is the first 
narrow argument raised by Collins. We could answer to this, however, that although 
precious information was gathered via an insider experience (Van Maanen, 1988 ; Becker, 
1998), the distanced analysis of the accumulated material and the sharing of arguments 
with outsiders undoubtedly added to the understanding of the situation. Therefore, it 
seems exaggerated to conclude that because one acknowledges the richness of direct 
experience (sensations and emotions), there is no going beyond this level of analysis. 
Another interesting issue is that of the historical context of the merger: to really understand 
what is at stake, this specific merger should be related to other mergers that have happened in 
the past and that have founded definition of a proper or improper merger. There is a 
historical dimension to this merger: it has been decided in a context of denationalisation by 
the French state. This vexed debate alone can be a lens of interpretation. The Snecma-Sagem 
merger can also be defined as one of the “diversification” type, the ones which were 
criticized for their lack of success after the 1990s. According to Hitt, Freeman and Harrison 
(2001: 385), the volume of M&A had been growing relentlessly in the past few years : the 80s 
“merger mania” (55 000 M&A at a total value of $ 1,3 trillion) had been followed by the 
“merger compulsive” 90s which lined up twice as many M&A for a total of $11 trillion. This 
tidal wave implied that M&A were then managers’ favourite growth strategy. Because 
financial performance were seldom improved and because some 70 percent of M&A failed to 
improve firms financial performance (in 2001), in the 2000s, the dominant opinion was that 
few acquisitions produced very high returns for the acquiring firm. Accordingly, their use was 
moderated and legitimated by specific goals: economies of scale and scope as well as market 
power. They are used in all regions of the world, as a major global phenomenon in 
consolidating industries, such as aircraft industries and electronics. 
This issue is directly related to Collins’ hermeneutical argument: social facts can be 
interpreted only if related to other facts. A merger can be understood only relatively speaking, 
and such a thing as “a merger” does not exist. However, if the main question if to range the 
Safran merger in the series of successful and failed mergers in past and present history, it is 
still necessary to take into account the specific nature of this merger which cannot be reduced 
to its hermeneutical context just as it has been necessary to take the past mergers for what 
they were to derive a hermeneutical context out of them. 
- A last issue that can be raised about the merger is that of the value creation. From an 
overall managerial point of view, the merger is justified if it followed by value 
creation via growth, risk reduction and profitability (Grant, 1998: 370). However, from 
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an organisational point of view, value creation may have a more specific meaning. It 
is less concerned with outside stakeholders and more interested by the well-being of 
the firm as a whole and of the employees individually. Success is a controversial issue 
depending on the way people build the criteria by which to judge the issue of a 
merger. One may consider that focusing on success and performance is a way to 
interpret facts that belongs to a set of conventions which are part of the dominant 
market ideology. If one defined success differently, then what is considered a priority 
in this merger (the respect of shareholders interests) may not be a priority and things 
may be looked at from a different perspective. 
The convention argument (social facts are built up by convention) is the last one Collins has 
called upon in his list of constructionist arguments. Although it may be true that 
organisational theory is forced to contest the conventional definition of success in 
management to dwell upon more qualitative aspects, the different dimensions of a merger 
seem to be sufficiently related to allow for judgement. In the conventional definition of 
success, therefore, there still is room for interpretation and evolution of the norms. Indeed, it 
is sometimes necessary to admit the reality of such notions as value creation, performance and 
competitive advantage (Durand, 2002) to reach a meaningful dimension and contest their 
omnipresence. This is why one may trace specific conventions for specific fields of analysis 
for which they are befitted. Generally, although there is a tension between strategizing and 
organizing (Jarzablowski, 2006), these two dimensions are still related and inter-dependant. 
The narrow arguments focus on specific aspects of human action, which means they insist on 
the observed instead of the observer. The three of them, the phenomenological, the 
hermeneutical and the convention arguments, are compatible because they build a world of 
representations which nature can be qualified as cognitive, a mixture of sensations, feelings, 
knowledge and learning and cultural norms. We admit that a good deal of what we experience 
is biased by these specific cognitive orientations, but we do not see the point in reducing the 
whole matter of thing to mind matters. Even though we shall not resort to breaking a chair, we 
offer a solid and matter-of-fact approach to social facts in the following section as a credible 
alternate solution to what seems to us a disembodied, paradoxical and unreasonably 
sophisticated way to account for realia. 
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Realism versus Constructionism: the case for an ontology of social facts 
 
In this second part, we use a critical point of view on realism to prove the case of a solid 
approach to social objects and facts that make it possible to present them in distanced and 
minute way so that they can be discussed. To prove our case, we have so far inverted the 
usual pattern of criticism, that of realism by constructionism. As we have shown in the first 
part, the criticisms addressed to realism does not prove that constructionism is the fittest 
method to adopt for strategy and organisation issues. More specifically, if we follow 
constructionism in its utmost assumptions (both explicit and implicit), we are missing of a 
steady ground to judge actions and make a difference between degrees of reality. We tried to 
make the point that an ontology was a must by illustrating each of the constructionist 
arguments with one issue taken from the Safran case. By showing that no clear solution can 
be found, in our view, without referring to an ontology of social facts, we did not however, 
pretend that this ontology had to correspond to universal criteria of truth value.  
This moderate version of realism is often disregarded in social sciences in general because 
most people have this criteria in mind when they think of realism (Berger & Luckman, 1996 
(1966) ; Le Moigne, 2007), just as some tend to believe that, because it has a history in 
Medieval Philosophy, its foundation is the existence of a Supreme Being. Let it be clear that, 
as far as we are concerned, our main goal is to find the best ways to account for social facts 
and realia. It is not our intention to carry the debate into further dimensions although we are 
aware this could be done. However, we believe it could be done as well from other points of 
view and our focus here is the reality of social objects. This is why we think it is necessary to 
present the advantages of a moderate realism as regard to social objects in more detail.  
Moderate realism is, to us, a modal version of realism. This means that its goal is not to 
reduce reality to the only objective facts and truths that they think can be universally 
admitted. They, on the contrary, try to typify objects and facts by looking at their degree of 
reality. Three dimensions can be pointed out: modal realism admits possible worlds, as 
opposed to the one real world. It is open to “vagueness”, which allows for changes and 
idiosyncrasy. Last but not least, modal realism can distinguish different layers of reality 
within a given social realm, the number and the combinatory nature of layers is often a key to 
the degree of reality of social facts. 
First, we show that a common ground exist between moderate constructionism and modal 
realism, and we look at the notion of possible worlds. We show that moderate realism and 
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moderate constructionism have the common problem of defending themselves against more 
radical stands they are often assimilated to. Then we go into two important dimensions of 
modal realism: vagueness and multi-layerism. 
 
Possible Worlds and Common Ground With Moderate Constructionism 
 
When insisting that there is a common ground between moderate constructionism and modal 
realism, we have to options to qualify this posture: “constructive realism” or “modal realism”. 
The two are defendable. The reason why we have chosen “modal realism” and not 
“constructive realism” is because we want to insist on the notion of “possible worlds”, which 
we hold on as an interesting option to analyse situations. To be specific, “possible worlds” in 
modal realism are all the possibility of different and incomplete combinations as opposed to 
the one present situation. Modal realism offers a good model for trees of decision and 
prospective hypothesis because of their combinatory nature. It is also its advantage over 
moderate constructionism in their common effort to make sense out of the complexity of 
social facts.  
Moderate constructionism is more embarrassed, we think, to face naive realism approaches, 
because it offers only a critique of the reality naïve realism conveys. Instead, modal realism 
reduces a “naïve realist” version of a given social whole to one of the “possible worlds” 
option. It can even offer a whole series of “naive realistic” possible worlds with which this 
one world can be combined. They may all capture one aspect of reality, but by lining them up 
and comparing them, it is visible that they each have oversimplified versions to offer, 
centered, for example, on a given proposition. If we go back to the Safran merger example, 
some naïve realist versions would offer a set of propositions which dependant variables may 
focus on market shares, governance or degree of trust. The nature of these assumptions create 
“possible worlds” with an inner law that corresponds to certain scientific criteria. If only 
because it is so far away from real social objects, these “possible worlds” must be taken into 
consideration, regardless of their influence on decision-makers, which would introduce a 
political dimension to the argument (Pettit, 2004). In itself, a “possible world” is full of 
information. 
This proves that in the realm of naïve realism, some notions remains incomplete which ends 
up in an unfaithful version of social objects. There is a more sparing way to deal with these 
interpretation than to show how each of them is a mere construct and deconstructing their 
picture of the world: one may consider them as partial interpretation that may pave the way 
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for more accurate versions, keen on sticking to social facts. This option is especially useful 
when dealing with very complex objects in a subtle way.  
The notion of “possible worlds” makes a major difference between moderate realism and 
moderate constructionism (Le Moigne, 2007). Apart from this point, we may, however, find a 
common ground. 
Indeed, to better understand the opposition between realism and constructionism, we need to 
have a clear vision of what they may agree on. The key oppositions are, in fact, rather few if 
one assumes a moderate position. To make this clearer, we present a vision of realism and 
constructionism from a philosophical point of view as opposed to more ideological matters, 
even though history and schools of thought need also to be taken into consideration (March, 
2007).  
As we shall see, the philosophical approach provides a distanced look on managerial realities 
and facts belonging to the organisational field and its environment. The specific advantage of 
philosophy is the fact that, although it can understand key notions in management, such a 
merger, synergy, competitive advantage, it refers to these concepts just as it refers to other 
concepts to describe social objects. Organizational life is also a social object, and it no more, 
no less interesting. In organisation science now, some splits have endured and make it 
difficult for each camp, realists and constructionists, to exchange their tools and concepts. 
Camps have emerged and they both stand their ground. We believe an outsider view may be 
useful to go back to social facts with no a priori orientation. When looking at a merger and 
describing it, a philosophical approach is parallel to and complementary with ethnography 
since they both try to make out dominant patterns in a diverse, complex, multifaceted reality. 
To do so, they must provide the micro-processes underlying facts, something hard 
constructionists would never do, since they argue facts are mere fictions. 
 
Moderate versus Radical Versions: A Common Battle 
 
A distinction should be made. between a non constructive, static version of realism (naive 
realism) and a constructive, dynamic version of realism. In particular, there is a case for 
critical realism, as to its approach to “facts” and “matter”. The necessity to draw a line 
between facts and fiction is a necessity to be able to send warnings about managerial 
discursive trends and information from the media. Some aspects of realism, such as absolute 
truth value of “propositions” are relaxed. In order to fit the idiosyncratic nature of specific 
case-studies., modal realism makes a difference between the truth of the propositions and the 
 17 
truth of the discourse composed of the propositions; whereas the first is non contextual, the 
second is obviously contextual : namely, it admits a discursive dimension, but this dimension 
is grounded on its own parts: propositions.  
However, the layered nature of reality does not imply that there is no inner coherence to 
isolated realms of social facts, and that these facts and objects stand in isolation. The 
compatibility between rules and realms is one of the key issue for organization scholars. This 
is why a relaxed version is open to constructionism because it allows for some parts of reality 
to be constructs, this is one of the reason why various criticisms can be addressed to varied 
situations and social structures. Therefore, both moderate realists and moderate 
constructionists have common “foes”. Indeed, in a similar way, a difference should be made 
between weak social constructionism and strong social constructionism in their approach to 
realism. From a weak constuctionnist point of view, “realism is produced by the way we 
speak or think about it, and by the way we explain it to others, by the concepts we use to 
encompass it” (Collins, 1997: 2) 
From a strong social constructionism point of view (Bruno Latour and Philippe Descola seem 
to be part of that school of thought), reality as a whole is a social construction, the separation 
between natural and cultural realms is arbitrary and what we call “natural” is no less a 
construct than what we call cultural (Collins, 1997). There is yet another difference: according 
to strong constructionism, everything is social, even what is denoted by scientific concepts 
(mass, gender, sun…). They pretend that even the rhetoric of case-study analysis is a special 
kind o f story meant to convince that “people have been there”, just as photo-reportage takes it 
legitimacy from direct and durable contact with the field of action. Most authors dealing with 
constructionist epistemology (Berger & Luckmann, 1966 ; Gergen, 2001 ; Hacking, 2001 ; 
Lincoln, 1985 ; Le Moigne, 2007) take a stand situated between these two extremes.  
We therefore conclude that the major difference between constructionists and realists stems 
from the fact that constructionists do not need to defend a coherent version of reality in 
addition to their analysis of constructs. Therefore, our next step will be to expose the approach 
of real objects by realism. It creates a scale of beings, relations and combinations via “layered 
dimensions” in a modal ensemble. Two key aspects of this modal realism are vagueness and 
degrees of reality this is why we define modal realism as not necessarily implying the 
existence of possibilia but as considering reality as a choice between a lot of models 
(vagueness) and not as only one level (multi layerism). 
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Vagueness 
 
We have an answer for ontological realists who think our approach to facts is a wolf in 
sheep’s clothing, namely constructionism undercover because it is modal. We think one 
notion can help make a difference between modal realism and constructionism in addition to 
possible worlds: the notion of vagueness. Modal realism takes a stand in favour of real 
vagueness. Usually we say that to be a realist is to admit an ontological vagueness (not only 
an espistemic vagueness). To constructionists, social objects are never “vague”, they are 
always fictional, and this is why some parts of the fiction are inconsistent. They even use 
these inarticulate aspects as part of their demonstration. 
This is why the question of “vagueness” is central to what we call “modal realism”, because it 
is a way to deal with the content of “being” in its definition. What are the criteria for “truth 
value” and “facts” if “truth value” and “facts” do not correspond to either a constructionist or 
a positivist stand (the universality of the truth-value, the importance of measurement and the 
assessment of the validity of construct via the test of propositions through independent 
variables and dependant variables) ? We have two answers to give and we believe they bring 
more nuances than the social constuctionism epistemologic stand of Berger & Luckmann 
(1996) for instance. 
- even though some facts have some truth value, they can be false: propositions (or 
sentences), as truthbearers, have to say so, but facts make truthbearers true — and so 
they are truthmakers. We say that some facts obtain. If a fact f obtains and is 
expressed by a sentence s, then s is true: f makes s true. This may mean that they 
belong to local realms and that their main features cannot be decontextualized. These 
are, in particular, due to the complex nature of social objects which not even the most 
sophisticated of the construct will transform into a clear entity: “The specific 
vagueness of social facts derives from the constitution of quasi-classes of activities 
which remain open” (Livet & Nef, 2007: 35) 
- even though some facts can be obtained in one situation, they may not always be 
because the compatibilities are subject to change and causalities may be multiple. This 
does not mean that anything can be said of anything. This does not mean either that 
facts are only a matter of opinion, a stand which may prove more dangerous for 
researchers than for the so-called “powers” they attempt to denounce as illegitimate. 
Modal realism is an attempt to discriminate the various degrees of reality in specific 
situations.  
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Therefore, instead of being a less clear vision of realism, modal realism is in fact saving a lot 
of arguments around the nature of reality and the ability to generalize from one case to 
another. For example, it is possible to admit that commitment exist, although it can only be 
indirectly measured (through indirect and indirect effects) and although it is very hard to draw 
a line between effects and co-emerging events and although the observable signs of 
commitment may be different from one firm to another. This is a happy compromise between 
a dismissal of these aspects because they are intangible and a locked-up definition of 
“commitment” according to a set of propositions prior to exploration of the field. Indeed, it is 
difficult to change quasi-classes of activities but in the social realm of facts, it is necessary to 
take into account recursivity
iv
. That way, the changes in the object of analysis can be taken 
into consideration as part of this same object, because there is a dynamic vision of it. We 
absolutely need this dynamic vision because in fact the basic elements of ontology are micro-
processes. These micro-processes combine multiple layers of reality, and this is what we shall 
presently show. 
 
Multi-Layerism: Layers and Combinations of Layers 
 
Though multi-layerism, we also have an answer for constructionists who think modal realism 
is in fact ontological realism, despite what it says, because it is only concerned with 
legitimating notions that are like clay pigeons. Far from trying to legitimize these “fakes”, we 
even think it is not enough to show that they are mere construct which could be done without. 
On the contrary, we try to understand how, given the nature of these objects, they can be part 
of the social fabric and change in nature. To be more specific about such a notion, let’s take 
the concept of commitment in organisational issues. We think it is multilayered. 
Constructionists would say it is an instrument of domination in organisations (Alvesson et 
Willmott, 1993). However, there are situations where commitment is beneficial for the 
“committed” and has a positive and democratic orientation. Where constructionism is unable 
to enter into more details inside this important dimension of organizational life, we propose a 
side section of commitment in the Safran merger and we show that the absence of some 
commitment dimensions may explain the difficulties of the operation and its moderate 
success.  
If, for example, we take the degree of commitment within an organisation, we may consider 
that there are many dimensions to commitment, and that facts and discourses move and 
revolve around this issue. A constructionist might point out that the problems of the Safran 
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failure was the discrepancy between over-enthusiastic speeches in the media by CEOs and the 
actual attitude of people within the group (surprise, then doubt and passive resistance). 
Namely managerial discourses insisted on the quality of commitment as a token for success, 
whereas employees were hostile to or at best not favourable to the merger. We propose a more 
specific mapping of the different degrees of commitment and their combination.  
In the constructionist version of the merger, no proper theory of commitment is offered. 
Constructionists may well say they can offer an ad hoc description of commitments too. 
Unfortunately, they are by principle at odds with giving such a description, because a theory 
of commitment would require of them a modal apparatus (since commitment is linked to 
virtual processes) which they reject. Yet, in such case as that Safran, we believe a theory 
about commitment is necessary because a merger implies different types of commitment. 
There is a complete explicit commitment, that of the contract and official agreement, but this 
implies a series of implicit commitments, both complete and incomplete. The explanation for 
a totally or partly failed merger lays on misunderstandings in the commitment. A social 
ontology is eager to provide a picture of commitment mechanisms, so that, in analysing a 
merger, one may fully take into account this dimension. If such an analysis is done before the 
merger begins, it can be a basis for advice, although the complexity of the social field makes 
it impossible to be predictive. It can also be used as an explanatory tool in the aftermaths of 
the merger, and this is what we provide as an illustration of our demonstration in favour of 
modal realism. 
We offer an analysis of commitment which is based on a concepts such as networks, virtual 
loops, etc., a series of tools which is also in use in semi-constructionism or methodological 
constructionism. This use is one of the reasons why we in no way mean to oppose 
constructionism and a realism which would be in perfect symmetry with it. To us, there is a 
common ground, only we combine these parts in a different way. For example, we admit that 
by combining an “epistemic assumption” and a “teleologic assumption” (le Moigne, 2007), 
constructionists may come around with interesting descriptions in such complex social issues 
as mergers and organizations. We just use different tools because our assumptions are 
different (social facts exist by themselves regardless of the knowing subject and they can be 
known). The merger implies an interaction between two collectives since a merger supposes a 
series of commitments at different levels relating two collective bodies (and the individuals 
composing these collective bodies). One must therefore combine an ontology of virtual 
processes (underlying  the various types of commitment) and an ontology of social objects 
such as organisations. This may illustrated by some insights into the Safran merger. 
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First, a personal notion of commitment exists: implicit commitment in one’s own name (I 
borrow something and I know I will put it back after use) or personal commitment by 
induction that may make become explicit afterwards (I borrow something and I put myself in 
a position to put it back by an act of conscious willpower) or personal commitment with the 
initial condition that it must be anticipated by its author (I borrow an object because I know 
that I will be able to give it back and the reason why I need to give it back is because I know 
others may need it too). This is a virtual loop, where the other is implicitly present. In the 
Safran case, the commitment of both top managers of the two merging firms implies that they 
have taken the step to merge because they could anticipate a positive return for their 
employees. They borrow the representative power of these people because they are convinced 
that this is what they would have decided to do in majority. 
Then, a notion of interpersonal commitment can be combined with the personal type of 
commitment: implicit and incomplete interpersonal commitment (mutatis mutandis, and it 
will be so next times, I can borrow something from someone and we both anticipate that I will 
give it back). In the Safran case, although nothing has been word has been said about the 
possible consequences of the merger, it is agreed that the decision has been motivated by the 
tacit agreement that the expected returns will be superior to the trade-offs for the stakeholders. 
You may also have implicit and complete interpersonal commitment (if someone else lets me 
take something, it is because he or she knows that I must give it back). In the functional 
definition of jobs, it is agreed that people within the organisation will work together in an 
organised way. Therefore, employees from Snecma will be cooperating with employees from 
Sagem once they will be part of the same group, Safran.  
Another version of this type of commitment is explicit and incomplete interpersonal 
commitment (I tell someone I will give back the thing I am borrowing but the reason why he 
or she believes me is because that is what I usually do and not because I said I would). In the 
Safran merger case, a success can be expected because Jean-Paul Béchat, for one, has 
conducted a number of acquisitions in the past that were deemed successful. However, even 
within Snecma, different coalitions exist, some of which are not convinced that these mergers 
were a good thing for the group. For example, the divisions which are geographically distant 
from the headquarters may feel less committed towards the group than the employees working 
Avenue du Général Marcel Vallin.  
You also find explicit and complete interpersonal commitment (someone else expects me to 
give the thing back because I said I would). This could involve a network relation, since other 
people may have been witness to this promise. The lender may be indirectly aware of the 
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commitment of the borrower to return the object. In the merger case, the managers from both 
groups have agreed with union representatives that there would not be immediate firings due 
to industrial and commercial synergies. These agreements may even have been stated on 
paper to remain as a warrant for future action. In the past, especially during massive strikes, 
workers in Snecma Moteurs (the largest factory) have been able to block activity. In the past, 
Sagem employees were part of the decision, since they were considered as both employees 
and shareholders of their group. This tradition is still vivid in the group, and it implies that 
there is a strong control of managers’ decisions. This may become a trial for managers since 
the word of the manager is at stake. 
The last type of commitment is explicit commitment (the other person is not sure I will give 
the thing back to I declare I will and by this declaration, I intend not only to announce what I 
will do but I word out a second degree commitment, I am giving my word by advance in 
addition to the thing I will be giving back later). In the Safran merger case, statements in the 
media by managers were meant to reassure stakeholders and employees as to the 
consequences of the merger. These statements were a public commitment. Some of them 
claimed that the stock-market would soon come to realize the potential of the merger, and 
they became problematic as the prices kept plummeting. This contradiction by facts became a 
factor of destabilization for the managers, especially Jean-Paul Béchat. A scandal developed 
when he was suspected of concealing information, which harmed his legitimacy already 
impaired by fights at the top of Safran. This discrepancy between facts and commitments may 
have caused the departure of older managers and the arrival of an older experimented 
manager; Francis Mer, who was famous for keeping his word.  
The realist interpretation of social objects and social facts present a vision of reality that is 
multi-layered. It can combine five different types of commitment, and it can show that 
because in some cases, some types of commitment are lacking, the conditions for a happy 
conclusion are not met. Time and evolution may act as processes to complement or to wither 
some dimensions. Instead of insisting on the context, we may be led to take into account 
changing networks within the “social object” at the center of the analysis, Safran as an 
organisation. Virtual loops and networks pave the way for “vagueness”: the classes of actions 
marked by commitment remain open just as degrees of commitment can complement each 
other. This implies that modal realism takes into consideration facts, words, but also the 
implications they convey. What would otherwise be classified either as discourses or as facts 
becomes part of the social process of organizing and meanings are necessarily interpreted in 
minute details, especially in situations that differ from routine. In the case of a new 
 23 
organisational being created as the result of a merger, this means that its institutional being is 
made of the network of actual processes and virtual relationships which condition the 
differences we make between the various degrees in ontology. The more unusual the situation, 
the less common interests the parties have, the more important it is to have a common ground 
to settle the issues at stake. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have attempted to reach a conclusion concerning the issue of the long lasting controversy 
of realism versus constructionism. We believe that this debate in management science should 
be referred to a tradition external to its own debate, that of metaphysics and ontology. 
Constructionists accuse realists of being interested only by simplistic phenomena, of which 
they give an even more simplistic image. Surely, mergers do not belong to the category of 
simple phenomena. However, we consider that realists have an advantage over 
constructionists, specifically when the merger is not working. We have shown that the 
commitment dimension is central and that to describe it, an ontological analysis effort is 
necessary. When one must depict processes, most of which are virtual, only a kind of realism 
admitting different types of alternatives in addition to the actual world is an option. Indeed, if 
a is committed to b to do c, a must anticipate the consequence of not doing c, measure the 
possible reaction of b once c has been done, etc. It is no enough to consider the action: a does 
c and the conventional tie between a and b about doing or not doing c.  
In its approach, modal realism could be accused of a being profligate with “being” in its 
definition of objects and relations, since we seem to suppose they each have a certain degree 
of reality, beyond discourses, where moderate constructionism may consider that there is no 
need to look for a reference for these concepts since they refer to nothing. We value 
imagination and incomplete references and we try to set limits between different degrees and 
dimensions of reality, since they combine in real life. In fact, our realism is modal because it 
is an attempt to take into consideration not only the essence of any given fact, but it 
combination with other facts which may be real or imaginary representations. This works 
since our modal modelling is combinatorial.  
This bears social and political implications. Through this text, we hope to have provided a 
convincing demonstration that an ontology of social facts not only exists but also should 
become a central issue for investigation in the following years. Indeed, not only does it offer 
ground for academic investigations, it also points out to new avenues for better understanding 
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of social issues and maybe ground for fair rules and regulations, a necessity that was clearly 
stated as soon as 1956 by Talcott Parsons (Parsons, 1956 in Stern and Barley, 1996). We 
believe there is a lot we can get to know, and that’s a fact. 
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i
  For that matter, it could provide a fictionalist ontology since it is nevertheless peopled with social objects. 
ii
 To make the difference between the two clear: the neo-realist positivist says “no need to worry about ontology; 
mathematics will do” whereas the social constructionist. says “what is social is a construct and any construct is 
fictional, therefore only fictions exist in the true sense of the word” – we can notice that this last stand is a 
metaphysical assertion, whereas the positivist’s position is only dismissive.  
iii
 These are suppliers, such a steel manufacturers, and clients, such as airline companies.  
iv
 The fact that, for exemple, people react to judgments and categories because they are able to understand it, 
which is not the case with objects. 
